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I. IntroductIon
“The government of the Union is neither in a legal nor 
a moral sense bound for the debts of the states, and 
it would be a violation of our compact of union to 
assume them…”
—James Knox Polk, 11th President of the  
United States, Inaugural Address March 4, 18451
1. See Polk (1845).
So far so good for the European Union in preventing 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis from spiraling out of control 
in the short term. But with Greece in May 2010 requiring 
an  unprecedented  bailout  from  the  European  Union/IMF   
to avoid immediate default and 25 of the European Union’s   
27 member states currently subject to an “excessive deficit 
procedure”  (European  Commission  2010i),  it  remains 
evident that the European Union’s existing fiscal surveillance 
framework patently failed both before and during the Great 
Recession and that Europe’s leaders must head back to the 
drawing board for a required long term reform of the EU fiscal 
policy and surveillance framework.2 
This reform process has already begun on multiple tracks 
in Brussels and elsewhere.3 On June 30 and September 29 the 
European Commission published a comprehensive package on 
enhancing European economic policy coordination (European 
Commission 2010a–g) and on July 9 the European Central 
Bank (ECB) presented its set of recommendations for institu-
tional changes in the EU fiscal policy framework.4 Meanwhile, 
a final report from the Task Force on Economic Governance 
headed  by  the  president  of  the  EU  Council,  Herman  van 
Rompuy, on the same set of issues will be presented at the EU 
Council in late October 2010. As such, a future reform of the 
EU fiscal surveillance framework is likely no later than at the 
final European Council meeting this year in December.
This policy brief will argue that the Greek bailout intro-
duces  an  unprecedented  degree  of  moral  hazard5  into  the 
European Union and the eurozone in particular, which will 
require  multiple  political  mechanisms  to  keep  it  in  check 
and prevent it from undermining public confidence in the 
2. See Kirkegaard (2010a) for an overview of the European Union’s early crisis 
response.
3. The EU Council in its conclusions on March 25, 2010, started this process, 
which is scheduled to conclude before the end of 2010. See EU Council 
(2010). 
4. See four speeches by ECB Governing Council members on July 9, 2010. 
Available at www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html. 
5. This policy brief will follow the broad definition of moral hazard as “any 
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to 
take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly” from Krugman 
(2000) and apply it at the level of sovereign state actors.
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which only one has currently been implemented, are required 
to check moral hazard in Europe going forward: strict ex post 
conditionality attached to bailouts (in place), strict ex ante 
fiscal rules in a reformed Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and 
a “eurozone orderly sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
(E-SDRM).” 
This policy brief will further argue that the longer-term 
reform of the EU fiscal policy framework and the SGP in 
particular takes place in a postcrisis Europe economic and 
political reality in which Germany has been greatly empow-
ered. With large-scale new integrationist measures politically 
impossible in Europe, but moral hazard introduced through 
the new precedent of eurozone bailouts, the European Union 
will have no choice but to, along German demands, imple-
ment reforms aiming for a far more fiscally disciplined Europe. 
II. the Longer-term ImpLIcatIons of the 
greek BaILout
The fact that bailouts now are an option inside the eurozone 
produces a new and critical concern for the broader EU insti-
tutional framework—moral hazard. This issue could precrisis 
conveniently be assumed away by policymakers through the 
existence of the “no bailout clause.” After the Greek bailout, 
this is no longer possible. Instead, practical measures must 
be taken to prevent eurozone governments from succumbing 
to the short-term temptation of running perhaps electorally 
popular, but ultimately unsustainable economic and especially 
fiscal policies.
When the euro was introduced in the late 1990s, the 
rationale presented for the politically binding SGP constraints 
on member states’ fiscal autonomy to prevent overborrowing 
was that this was necessary to preserve the stability of the 
common  currency.7  This  was  essentially  a  German  “anti-
6. This policy brief is loosely based on postings by the author on the Peterson 
Institute RealTime Economics Issues Watch during the summer of 2010, 
where they benefited greatly from the advice of Steve Weisman. RealTime is 
available at www.piie.com/realtime.
7. See for instance von Hagen (1991), Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), de 
Grauwe (1994) and Eichengreen and von Hagen (1995).
inflation argument,” since the EU Treaty’s (in theory at least) 
explicit “no bailout clause” was assumed to rule out the kind 
of “direct government-to-government bailout” that was ulti-
mately granted Greece.8 The concern was instead that exces-
sive government debts would force the ECB to monetize such 
debts and that inflation would ensue. 
Yet  as  the  direct  government-to-government  bailout 
granted to Greece in May 2010 occurred in the midst of a 
global  economic  crisis  with  low  capacity  utilization,  large 
output gaps, and high unemployment rates across the eurozone 
(European Commission 2010b), it has had no inflationary 
impact and seems extremely unlikely to in the future. The 
same is true for the associated actions of the ECB. The small 
and  (almost)  wholly  sterilized  Securities  Markets  Program 
(SMP) has no inflationary impact in Europe, while in fact 
the direct government bailout of Greece limits the immediate 
risk of excessive deterioration of the asset quality of accept-
able collateral for market transactions with the ECB, as well as 
similarly reducing the riskiness of SMP purchases of periph-
eral sovereigns’ debt.9 As such, contrary to many concerns in 
Germany, the 2010 Greek bailout and related ECB actions 
will not result in higher inflation in the eurozone and hence 
for at least that reason do not warrant a “toughened-up SGP.”
However,  the  direct  government-to-government  Greek 
bailout instead produces a different and more important reason 
for Europe to put more teeth into the postcrisis successor to 
the SGP. The risk of moral hazard from any type of bailout is 
well known, but as will be elaborated below when dealing with 
sovereign actors an additional set of concerns arises related to 
public opinion in the countries involved.
First though, how the events related to the Greek sover-
eign debt crisis in the spring of 2010 have had lasting effects 
on the political circumstances surrounding EU fiscal surveil-
lance must be laid out. Three key issues bear mentioning here:
The Precedent for “Conditional EU Bailouts”  
Has Been Set
Originally the “no bailout clause” in the EU Treaty was imag-
ined, in times of relative global economic calm, to prevent the 
transfer of a single fiscally irresponsible member’s liabilities 
8. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) consists of pooled bilateral 
loan guarantees from all of the eurozone members, and as such is functionally 
the near equivalent of a jointly issued Eurobond.
9. The ECB has further introduced a new set of risk control measures in its 
framework for eligible collateral, including a series of haircuts for lower quality 
assets. See http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/sp090728_1annex.en.
pdf?bbe012c6ad9bb6d4b1991269a2b19826. 
The fact that bailouts now are an option 
inside the eurozone produces a new 
and critical concern for the broader EU 
institutional framework—moral hazard.
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2to  other  fiscally  more  responsible  members.10  As  it  turned 
out in 2010, definitely the spirit, if not the letter of the “no 
bailout clause” was broken in the midst of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis, as it threatened to spread to several other eurozone 
countries. 
Considering that it is next to impossible in a closely inte-
grated but aging eurozone with relatively low future poten-
tial growth rates to imagine a scenario where another single 
member could slide toward default without other members 
being affected by contagion in a broadly similar manner as 
in the spring of 2010, future bailouts now seem unavoidable. 
In any game of “bailout chicken” with a default-threatened 
member and financial markets, other eurozone governments 
will inevitably blink first.
Simply put, no eurozone member will ever be allowed to 
enter into a “sudden disorderly default.” Making an analogy to 
the recent banking crisis, all sovereigns in the eurozone were 
found to be “too big to fail,” at least in a disorderly manner 
that risked contagion.11 At the same time, it should be recalled 
that larger members of the eurozone may simply be “too big to 
bail out” as basic feasibility concerns must inevitably continue 
to be addressed on a case-by-case basis when bailouts of larger 
eurozone members are discussed. “Political automaticity” in 
bailouts of eurozone members therefore relates principally to 
small members like Greece (Portugal or Ireland).
The fact that, despite earlier insisting on having both a 
“no bailout clause” and the SGP, German parliamentarians 
have now overwhelmingly backed the Greek bailout and the 
creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
supports  this  conclusion.  Irrespective  of  what  the  German 
Constitutional  Court  ultimately  rules  with  respect  to  the 
legality under German law of the German government’s partic-
ipation in both the Greek bailout and the subsequent creation 
of the EFSF, it will not change the fact that an overwhelming 
majority of the German parliament approved hereof in early 
10. Article 125 in the Consolidated EU Treaty reads: “The Union shall not be 
liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local 
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of any member state, without prejudice to mutual financial 
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A member state shall 
not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, 
local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or 
public undertakings of another member state, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.” See http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200
:EN:PDF.
11. Note how General Motors, while bailed out initially by the US federal 
government at the height of the financial crisis in late 2008 was ultimately 
allowed to go into bankruptcy when financial markets were more calm in 
the spring of 2009. Similarly, it cannot at this point be ruled out that Greece 
will ultimately restructure on its debts at some point in the future, despite its 
initial bailout in May 2010.
May 2010. Only the left-wing Linke Party, with a little more 
than 10 percent of the total vote in the recent German elec-
tions, opposed the bailout.12 
The presence of an overwhelming majority in favor among 
Germany’s elected parliamentarians can hardly pass unnoticed 
by the appointed judges on the Constitutional Court as they 
consider their verdict. In any case, though, this majority virtu-
ally ensures that the German government and parliament can 
find a way around any adverse ruling, despite the ruling coali-
tion’s loss of the German Upper House majority in regional 
elections in May 2010.
The broad political consensus in Germany concerning the 
country’s participation in the official sector bailout of Greece—a 
country that through things like its cooked government books 
and bizarrely low retirement ages seems, in a political sense, 
uniquely undeserving of any outside assistance—clearly estab-
lishes the political precedent that eurozone members finding 
themselves in acute fiscal problems in the future will also be 
rescued.  After  the  Greek  bailout,  probably  only  a  eurozone 
country that suddenly declared war on a neighbor (and thereby 
got into fiscal trouble the same way most countries historically 
have) could be considered ineligible. 
Yet at the same time as a bailout precedent has now been 
set, it is equally clear that the Greek rescue package was, as 
well  as  future  similar  bailouts  will  be,  subject  to  stringent 
conditionality. The fact that Greece is now essentially under-
going a standard IMF program to qualify for EU/IMF funds 
means that the bailout agreed in the spring of 2010 is probably 
the best thing that has ever happened to promote structural 
economic reforms in Greece. 
Irrespective  of  whether  Greece  will  ultimately  have  to   
restructure its debts or not, the country will, as a result of the 
IMF program, have eliminated a host of unsustainable social and 
economic institutions, most noticeably its erstwhile disastrously 
12. As discussed in Kirkegaard (2010b), the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany abstained from the vote, but only due to the insufficient “private 
sector banking participation” (i.e., the absence of bailing in private creditors) 
in the proposal.
Yet at the same time as a bailout precedent 
has now been set, it is equally clear 
that the Greek rescue package was, as 
well as future similar bailouts will be, 
subject to stringent conditionality.
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3designed pension system.13 This is unambiguously a long-term 
positive for the Greek and broader European economy.
While reform-shy policymakers in Europe may therefore 
now look forward to ultimately receiving a bailout from the 
European Union/IMF, it will invariably take the form of a polit-
ically poisoned chalice entailing that they will lose a substantial 
amount  of  sovereignty  and  have  to  undertake  precisely  the 
kinds of structural reforms previously avoided only now in an 
expedited manner under the guidance of the IMF.14
In establishing the precedent for bailouts in Europe, the 
first mechanism to limit related moral hazard was therefore 
also entrenched.
Intra-Eurozone Bond Spreads Will Be Permanent and 
Germany Is Now the Eurozone Safe Haven
Membership of a monetary union by definition eliminates 
the  possibility  of  individual  governments  receiving  market 
price  signals  regarding  their  longer-term  relative  economic 
performance from the exchange rate of a national currency. In 
the precrisis eurozone of very closely converging government 
bond yields, there were similarly no “market price signals” to 
governments from the bond markets. This artificial insula-
tion of eurozone governments from market signals, however, 
dramatically  changed  after  the  beginning  of  the  global 
economic crisis. This is illustrated in figure 1 with 10-year 
government  benchmark  bond  yields  for  selected  eurozone 
members and Germany from Jan 1, 2008.
Figure  1  shows  how  spreads  began  to  widen  between 
Germany  and  the  weaker  eurozone  countries  when  the 
global  recession  reached  Europe  following  the  collapse  of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Intra-eurozone spreads 
continued to widen during the first panic phase of the crisis, as 
peripheral eurozone sovereigns began acknowledging the fiscal 
effects of required bank rescues, housing market corrections, 
and economic recessions. 
During the first nine months of 2009, a gradual narrowing 
took place, until the announced upward revisions of Greece’s 
deficit data in October 2009 started the second “sovereign 
13. The Greek parliament on July 8 approved an EU/IMF-dictated overhaul of 
its public pension system that will entail cuts to pension benefits, introduce se-
vere penalties for early retirement, increase the statutory retirement age by up 
to 10 years to 65 for both men and women, increase required contributions, 
and change the formula for the calculation of pensions. See Paakkinen (2010).
14. EU leaders were very clear when setting up the EFSF (€440 billion) that 
“Its activation is subject to strong conditionality, in the context of a joint EU/
IMF support, and will be on terms and conditions similar to the IMF.” As 
such, 100 percent IMF conditionality on any future EU funds committed is 
assured. See ECOFIN Council (2010). 
phase” of the European economic crisis. As the Greek sover-
eign crisis turned acute in early May 2010 and threatened to 
spread  to  other  eurozone  members,  German  10-year  bond 
yields fell to historic lows and significant and sustained spreads 
opened up to all other weaker eurozone economies and even 
to French bonds. The worse Europe’s economic and sovereign 
debt crisis has become, the more powerful has been the effect 
of Germany’s new “safe-haven status.”
In an aging Europe, where future demographic trends will 
severely restrict opportunities for countries to simply grow out 
of their elevated postcrisis debt levels, and where weaker euro-
zone members—noticeably Ireland, Spain and Portugal—have 
gradually  (and  belatedly)  lost  their  top-notch  credit  ratings 
and all face serious questions regarding their long-term growth 
prospects, Germany’s new safe haven status among at least euro-
denominated assets looks likely to become entrenched. 
Given the longer-term economic outlook for Europe, irre-
spective of what reforms will be made to the SGP, European 
government bond markets are unlikely to fall back into their 
dangerous precrisis lull. While markets can remain irrational 
for very long periods of time and for instance gravely misprice 
eurozone  government  bonds  for  a  decade  until  September 
2008, upon realizing such a mistake they very rarely make the 
same mistake again.
Direct price signals from the bond markets to eurozone 
governments will remain and any future eurozone bond yield 
convergence seem likely only as the result of a convergence of 
underlying economic fundamentals toward a more sustainable 
debt outlook. Just as financial markets up until the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the revelation of the true state of Greek 
public finances gave eurozone governments the opportunity to 
ignore longer-term economic sustainability concerns, the finan-
cial markets have now taken away this opportunity. Europe 
has therefore gained from this crisis an important and hitherto 
missing long-term progrowth promoter, as higher bond yields 
have proven very effective at forcing recalcitrant EU govern-
ments to “bite the bullet” on required structural reforms.
The Greek Demonstration Effect
Thirdly, events in Greece have now shown EU voters just what 
can  happen  if  governments  run  unsustainable  fiscal  policies 
for too long and they clearly don’t like what they have seen. 
Political  platforms  of  fiscal  austerity  have  triumphed  in  all 
national EU elections (held in the Netherlands, Slovakia, the 
UK and remarkably even crisis-stricken Latvia) since the start 
of the Greek crisis, and recent polls in the large EU countries 
similarly  point  to  very  significant  public  support  for  fiscal 
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Figure 1     Euro area 10-year sovereign bond yields January 2008–October 2010
10-year government bond yields





























5austerity measures.15 Most remarkable is the recent reelection of 
the Latvian government, which occurred after an approximately 
20 percent decline in GDP per capita levels.16 Hence, even large 
and rapid “internal devaluations” in the eurozone (and associ-
ated countries like Latvia) should correspondingly not be ruled 
out as “politically impossible.”
This suggests that the “demonstration effect” arising from 
Greece’s problems has raised the domestic political costs for 
European governments of running unsustainable fiscal poli-
cies considerably. Future serial offenses against reformed EU 
fiscal rules due to individual member states’ lax budgetary 
policies (i.e., unrelated to a dramatic global economic slow-
down and financial crisis as seen in 2008–10) consequently 
seem less likely. 
This trend toward a more lasting political consensus about 
fiscally sustainable policies is moreover strengthened by the 
abandonment—as a result of the economic crisis—of tradi-
tional “looney left” economic policies, e.g., things like exces-
sively low retirement ages and rigid Employment Protection 
Legislation  (EPL),  by  the  mainstream  Southern  European 
center-left parties. The belated embrace (under the watchful 
eye of bond markets and, in the case of Greece, overseen by 
the forceful arm twisters of the IMF/European Union) of more 
promarket “supply side” social policies, guided by individual 
incentives and aimed at reducing government spending, by the 
ruling Spanish socialist party PSOE, the Portuguese PS, and 
of course Greece’s socialist PASOK, mirrors the shift to the 
15. The early July 2010 Financial Times/Harris poll showed how two-thirds 
of voters in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom in late 
June 2010 believed that public spending cuts would “help the economy.” See 
Barber (2010).
16. See Åslund (2010) for a discussion of the Latvian case.
political center on economic policies undertaken by Northern 
Europe’s social-democratic parties in the 1980s and 1990s.17
What this means is that for the first time in Southern 
Europe—and broadly similar to the situation in the recent 
decade in Northern Europe— there will be a centrist majority 
broadly in favor of fiscally sustainable policies comprising the 
mainstream center-left and center-right parties. Despite the 
likely strengthening of the two political extremes as a result 
of this mainstream center-left shift to the center on economic 
policies,  in  Southern  Europe’s  proportional  representation 
political systems, which (unlike closed primary elections in 
the United States) tends to leave political extremes outside 
any influence, the new electoral majorities in favor of fiscal 
austerity will prove lasting.18
In  summary,  the  three  key  longer-term  effects  of  the 
Greek debt crisis are therefore that conditional bailouts will 
happen in Europe; that Germany is now the eurozone safe 
haven once again benefitting from lower interest rates than 
other members; and that running fiscally unsustainable poli-
cies has become more politically costly in Europe.
III. the new need for enhanced ex ante 
fIscaL dIscIpLIne
In a eurozone where repeated direct government-to-govern-
ment bailouts are probable, without new counter-measures   
governments that now know they are likely to be bailed out 
by other members of the monetary union19 even if they pursue 
reckless fiscal policies may be more prone to do so. However, 
voters in other eurozone countries, who now know they may 
have to pay up but have no immediate control over the ex ante 
government spending habits of bailed-out countries, are on 
their side more likely to demand an end to this moral hazard 
by  restricting  the  opportunities  of  their  elected  officials  to 
agree to bailouts.
Having seen how the supranational Lisbon Treaty and 
SGP failed, in the future European voters may instead enforce 
such restrictions retroactively and at the national level. This is 
what happened when the newly elected Slovakian parliament 
17. Today, Europe’s only mainstream center-left party with a patently unsus-
tainable fiscal policy platform is France’s Socialist Party under the leadership of 
Martine Aubry.
18. As discussed in Kirkegaard (2010c), new populist parties have emerged 
in Northern Europe combining right-wing anti-immigration policies with 
support for traditional left-wing welfare policies aimed at pampering especially 
blue-collar workers and (early) retirees. This combination of left- and right-
wing policies requires the presence of a politically very skilled and disciplined 
populist leader to be sustained. 
19. Obviously, the rest of the European Union and entire global community 
also participated in the Greek bailout.
In summary, the three key longer-term 
effects of the Greek debt crisis are 
therefore that conditional bailouts will 
happen in Europe; that Germany is now 
the eurozone safe haven once again 
benefitting from lower interest rates 
than other members; and that running 
fiscally unsustainable policies has become 
more politically costly in Europe.
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the Greek bailout with a 69-1 vote (14 abstentions) in early 
August 2010.20
Slovakia of course is small (and its domestic banks have 
next  to  no  exposure  to  highly  indebted  countries)  and  its 
reluctance to directly financially support much richer Greece 
is understandable, but the broader risk is that EU leaders lose 
the political room for maneuver “to do what they have to do” 
in the next sovereign debt crisis, namely authorize another 
conditional bailout. 
Partly, this problem is inherent to representative democ-
racy, as elected governments cannot possibly in the midst of a 
financial crisis “put a bailout before voters” ahead of agreeing 
to the bailout. Democratic control can instead happen only ex 
post when voters pass their verdict on their government at the 
next election.
Credible ex ante constraints must be put on the fiscal 
policies of all eurozone members to reduce the risk that public 
opposition  in  Germany  and  elsewhere  will  constrain  the 
options of their elected officials in a future crisis situation to 
send their taxpayer euros to bail out other eurozone countries 
(even with IMF conditions attached).
Just as in democracies there can generally be no “taxation 
without representation” (except here in Washington, DC, of 
course), in the eurozone there can be no lasting option for “bail-
outs without credible ex ante fiscal rules.” Tough fiscal sanc-
tions are required in a reformed SGP to politically retain the 
possibility to solve a future crisis through another bailout, i.e., 
precisely the outcome they nominally are intended to prevent.
Robust  fiscal  rules  for  EU  and  eurozone  members  in 
particular thus make up the second required mechanism to 
limit moral hazard in the European Union going forward. 
Here the decisions taken at the margins of the Council of the 
20. See Tomek (2010). Ultimately, as the missing Slovakian share of the Greek 
program is very small, it has been made up for by other euro-zone members. 
But needless to say, if hypothetically in the future Ireland—a country sub-
stantially richer in GDP per capita terms than the EU average—were to seek 
assistance, this political interstate distributional issue would become acute.
European Union (ECOFIN) meeting on October 19, 2010,21 
and included in the Franco-German Deauville Declaration 
from Oct 18, 2010,22 lay down important guidelines for what 
will ultimately be decided by EU leaders.
The general surveillance of EU members’ fiscal policies 
looks likely to be strengthened as does the ability of EU statis-
tical agencies to verify member states’ data. Both are necessary 
improvements of the current framework. However, it looks 
clear that the “corrective arm” of the SGP will remain a “polit-
ical  institution”  and  any  financial  sanctions  against  fiscally 
wayward members will remain subject to a qualified-majority 
vote among EU/eurozone members.23 As such, the SGP sanc-
tions will not be automatic and look highly unlikely to ever 
be implemented (at least against a large member state). At the 
time  of  writing  (mid-October  2010)  therefore,  EU  leaders 
look unlikely to agree to the required strengthening of fiscal 
rules, in order to be able to seriously contain moral hazard in 
the European Union in the future. This disappointing situa-
tion demands that stronger measures to contain moral hazard 
must be taken elsewhere. 
Traditional tools of European policymaking, such as insti-
tutionalization  in  the  European  Commission,  peer  pressure 
among member states, and the SGP itself will correspondingly 
not play any prominent role in containing moral hazard in the 
eurozone under the new bailout precedent. This marks a note-
worthy shift from previous crises in Europe, where new institu-
tions were typically relied upon to provide the crisis solution.
IV. THE PolITICal CoNSTraINTS FaCING 
rEFormErS oF THE EU FISCal PolICy 
FramEWork
When  analyzing  the  options  available  for  European  leaders 
undertaking longer-term reform of EU institutions (i.e., when 
they are not in the short term trying to stop an accelerating 
market panic at 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning before the Asian 
markets  open),  it  is  important  to  realize  the  tight  political 
checks they operate under. In many ways, Europe’s leaders are 
far more politically constrained than many critics acknowledge. 
This is particularly true of most macroeconomists, who 
frequently  predict  the  failure  of  the  European  Monetary 
Union, simply because its central institutions do not fully fit 
the normative descriptions of their presently dominant para-





23. See Kirkegaard (2010d) for details.
Yet, the political reality facing Europe’s 
elected officials is quite different 
and they have to deal with the world 
as it is, not as textbooks or special 
interests would like it to be.
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7“Optimal  Currency  Area”  theory’s  demand  for  a  “central 
transfer mechanism.”24 
It is similarly true of many Brussels insiders, who often 
seems to espouse the nakedly self-promoting view that which-
ever new problem Europe is faced with, a new EU institu-
tion must be created to address this concern, while EU public 
opinion will automatically be supportive hereof. 
Yet, the political reality facing Europe’s elected officials is 
quite different and they have to deal with the world as it is, not 
as textbooks or special interests would like it to be. It is crucial 
therefore  to  note  the  two  overarching  political  constraints 
that today will inevitably shape the coming reform process of 
Europe’s fiscal framework.
The referendum reality
Unlike  previous  generations  of  EU  leaders,  say  a  Kohl, 
Mitterrand, or Delors—whose “European visions” were often 
based on their initial ability to ignore the opinions of their 
voters,25 EU leaders today face the political reality of having 
to win popular referenda in multiple member states, if they 
want to dramatically reform EU institutions and the existing 
Lisbon Treaty. 
While legally minor changes to the Lisbon Treaty will 
remain  feasible  without  likely  triggering  political  or  auto-
matic constitutional requirements for referenda in individual 
member states (if the proposed changes are small and do not 
involve the transfer of any national sovereignty to the suprana-
tional EU level), far-reaching reforms of the Lisbon Treaty are 
simply not politically feasible in today’s Europe. As proven by 
the decade-long process required to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, 
this is certainly true of any treaty reforms that involve addi-
tional economic integration at the supranational level. 
Moreover, as this is the political reality for members of 
the eurozone, such as Ireland, the prospects of rapid addi-
tional integration within the eurozone only under the Lisbon 
Treaty’s  “enhanced  cooperation”  mechanism  looks  equally 
dim.26 Constraint by this inability to dramatically change the 
24. See for instance Feldstein (2010) and Krugman (2010) for this type of 
euro-critiques.
25. Francois Mitterrand did on September 20, 1992, consult French voters 
regarding the Maastricht Treaty. The question was asked “Do you approve the 
draft law put to the French people by the President of the Republic authoriz-
ing the ratification of the Treaty on European Union?” On a turnout of 69.8 
percent, 51 percent voted “yes,” while 49 percent voted “no.” See Criddle 
(1993).
26. “Enhanced cooperation” under the Lisbon Treaty requires that at least 
nine EU member states participate from the beginning, that it is open to new 
members, and that the policies are accepted by a qualified majority in the EU 
Council (unanimity is required in foreign and defense issues) and a majority in 
Lisbon  Treaty  without  triggering  popular  referenda  means 
that any reforms must be relatively de minimis in scope.
This constraint clearly suggests that the Franco-German 
proposal from Deauville about changing the EU Treaty to 
allow for, among other things, the suspension of voting rights 
in the EU Council for members in breach of the SGP, will not 
be feasible in the foreseeable future and definitely not by the 
2013 time schedule intended by German and French lead-
ers.27 Considering the large share of legislation passed today by 
national EU parliaments that has its origin in EU-level regu-
lation and negotiations, suspending a member state’s voting 
rights in the EU Council would be an extremely undemo-
cratic act, likely to spur very substantial anti-European feel-
ings  in  the  member  state  thus  targeted.  Even  traditionally 
pro-European  Union  national  political  elites  in  a  member 
state sanctioned in this way could be expected to feel increas-
ingly disenchanted with the European Union and “the Idea of 
Europe.” Correspondingly, this proposal is both undemocratic 
and dangerous. Fortunately, it looks extremely unlikely to be 
supported by member states and even less so by their elector-
ates in what will be required referenda in several member states 
to ratify such Treaty changes. Suspension of voting rights in 
the European Union due to excessive deficits will never occur 
and this proposal is therefore mostly a distraction. 
The lack of a Pan-European Public Identity
Despite the fact that the European Union is easily the most 
deeply institutionalized regional grouping in the world today 
and operates through a pooling of member states’ national 
sovereignty  that  is  probably  unthinkable  elsewhere  in  the 
world, it nonetheless exists without anchoring in a genuine 
popular  identity.  The  European  Union  and  its  institutions 
have  been  created  overwhelmingly  as  a  top-down  project 
by European policy elites composed of elected officials and 
government  bureaucrats,  acting  as  representatives  of  their 
respective national populations. 
Rule-making and regulation at the European level have 
historically  proven  acceptable  to  EU  publics,  as  they  have 
persistently  reelected  their  generally  pro-European  leaders 
responsible for transferring national sovereignty to Brussels 
(this is true, even if they reject the same politicians’ appeals 
in occasional referenda about specific EU-related topics). At 
the same time, however, it is important to realize that even 
today Brussels’ competences very deliberately do not cover the 
the European Parliament. As such, if a qualified minority of EU member states 
wishes to block others from proceeding, they can do so.
27. See http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank_objects/Franco-german_dec-
laration.pdf.
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8public policy subject areas most important to the everyday 
lives  of  individual  voters,  including  social  policy,  labor 
markets, health care, and taxation.28 
Indeed, when looking at the extremely complicated EU 
decision-making apparatus, complete with exclusive “commu-
nity  powers”  in  some  subject  areas  (or  pillars),  concurrent 
or exclusive member state jurisdiction in others, as well as 
the  extensive  institutional  checks-and-balances  between 
the European Commission, the EU Council (i.e., member 
states’ governments) and the European Parliament, it quickly 
becomes clear that EU institutions originate in a host of very 
finely balanced political compromises. And that these compro-
mises between “integrationist and nationalist political forces” 
in turn are shaped by a fairly astute political understanding of 
just how much EU integration is ultimately acceptable to EU 
publics.29 
Radical  changes  of  existing  EU  institutions,  even 
following unprecedented economic events such as the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis, are consequently unlikely. Any change 
will be incremental and large leaps of new integration and 
institution-building are not feasible, as the EU population 
continues to lack a pan-European identity and instead over-
whelmingly retain their identities at the national level. This is 
illustrated in figure 2 with the most recent polling data from 
the European Commission.30
28. In addition the “subsidiarity principle” enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty’s 
Article 5 is intended to ensure that legal decisions are taken as closely as pos-
sible to the citizen, and that repeated actions are taken to ascertain whether 
action at the EU level is justified when considering the possibilities available at 
national, regional, or local levels. 
29. Similarly, it is clear from analyzing the very finely balanced internal EU 
decision-making procedures painstakingly established over decades, just how 
difficult it will be for the European Union under the new Lisbon Treaty to put 
together a coherent and unified external EU representation while simultane-
ously maintaining national member state foreign policies and representations. 
How the balance between European Union and member states external repre-
sentation will work in practice will likely, as with internal EU decision-making 
processes, take decades to establish in practice. 
30. Numerous different polls exist concerning the “identity of Europeans.” 
However, relying on the polling data from the European Commission’s 
Eurobarometer has several advantages. First of all, it ensures that polling data 
Figure 2 shows how 90 percent of EU-27 residents on 
average self-identify as either “only nationals” of their home 
country or as “first nationals, then Europeans,” and that only in 
Luxembourg (a small country with numerous EU institutions) 
does this percentage drop below 80 percent. In other words, 
an overwhelming majority of voters in all EU member states 
self-identify as principally nationals of their home country, a 
polling result that has been quite stable for decades.31
This matters tremendously when considering the oppor-
tunities for EU leaders to launch a greatly expanded central 
EU budget or even a common EU fiscal policy with regular 
large-scale transfers across borders. It is not a coincidence that 
the current EU budget is capped at 1.24 percent of EU GNP, 
i.e., numerically quite similar to the share of Europeans who 
declare themselves “only European.” Large majorities of self-
identified EU member state nationals will simply not accept 
large  and  regularized  transfers  of  national  tax  revenues  to 
Brussels or other member states. 
The general willingness of Europeans to accept high levels 
of taxation, a feature closely related to the historically relatively 
high degree of homogeneity inside European nation states (all 
welfare states stop at the national border!), does manifestly not 
extend to paying taxes to the European Union in Brussels. In 
many ways this resistance against paying taxes at the “conti-
nental level” among Europeans is conceptually similar to the 
generally higher unwillingness of Americans to pay “taxes to 
their continental capital” in Washington, DC.
Moreover,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  believe  that,  for 
instance, US fiscal history suggests that the emergence of the 
gradually more powerful centralized government (e.g., the US 
federal government) led to any immediate increase in its fiscal 
weight. This is illustrated in figure 3.
Figure 3 plots total US federal government expenditures 
from  1792  to  2009,  as  well  as  total  federal  expenditures 
excluding federal spending related to US engagement in war 
fighting.32 It can be seen in figure 3 that only by the onset 
results are collected using similar methodologies across all member states. 
Secondly, the same polling question has been asked several times, so a “time 
series” of data results is available. And thirdly, with the Eurobarometer being 
part of a decade-long project sponsored by the European Commission, there is 
a very limited risk of “funding bias” in individual poll results.
31. Results in figure 2 rely on data from Eurobarometer 64.2 (European 
Commission 2005). The same question was asked in the earlier Eurobarometer 
62 (European Commission 2004) with essentially the same result. See an 
overview of earlier Eurobarometer questions concerning European identity at 
http://www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/umfragedaten/eurobarometer-
data-service/eb-trends-trend-files/list-of-trends/europ-identity/?tx_eurobaro-
mater_pi1[vol]=Cultural percent20identity,National percent20/ percent20Eu-
ropean percent20identity,1395&tx_eurobaromater_pi1[pos1]=335&tx_euro-
baromater_pi1[pos2]=16. 
32. Figure 3 data for total federal spending, excluding War Department and 
Large majorities of self-identified EU 
member state nationals will simply 
not accept large and regularized 
transfers of national tax revenues to 
Brussels or other member states. 
N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 5   oc t o b e r   2 0 1 0
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years after the end of the American Revolutionary War in 
1783—had the US federal budget, excluding expenditures to 
war fighting, grown to a size significantly beyond the scope of 
today’s EU budget of about 1.17 percent of EU GDP.33 And 
only following the New Deal in the 1930s and World War II 
did the US federal government permanently grow to a scale far 
beyond the EU budget. 
With a just over 50-year history and fortunately no chance 
of ever being in charge of a war, the EU budget—superficially 
compared to US fiscal history—should therefore remain at 
today’s level for decades to come.
In summary, rapid institutional shifts toward a European 
“Fiscal/Transfer Union” with a large centralized Brussels-based 
budget are simply not politically feasible in Europe without 
Navy Department up until 1915 excludes civil expenditures in the War and 
Navy Departments.
33. Note that the EU budget is estimated as roughly 1.24 percent of EU GNI, 
which is slightly lower than EU GDP.
a common identity and where referenda are required for the 
foreseeable future.
V. why germany has gaIned so much 
poLItIcaLLy from the greek soVereIgn 
deBt crIsIs
“Normal countries,” even if they are members of the European 
Union and pool large parts of their sovereignty, tend none-
theless  to  want  to  maximize  their  national  influence  over 
their neighbors and their geographic region. With Germany 
today  finally  a  wholly  “normal  country,”  no  longer  exces-
sively  constrained  by  its  past  in  its  peaceful  pursuit  of  its 
national interest, this logic now applies in Berlin, too. And as 
the eurozone’s new revealed safe haven country, maximizing 
Germany’s national interest within the EU will become a lot 
easier postcrisis.
German bond yields now decline in times of crisis, while 
the yields of peripherals rise, which will make any German 
demands for more fiscal discipline weightier. Thanks to its 






















































































1. Answer to question “In the near future, do you see yourself as….?”.  “Don’t know” answers excluded. 
Source: Eurobarometer 64.2.
  National only        First national, then European        First European, then national        European only
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10stronger fiscal outlook and external surpluses, Germany—in 
any serious future economic policy clash with its EU part-
ners—can now afford simply to say “nein,” sit back, watch 
spreads widen, and let its new ally in the global bond markets 
convince its EU partners of the need for fiscal discipline and 
economic reform. 
It would be foolish to underestimate how such “economic 
crisis power” translates into continuously enhanced political 
power,  as  the  other  EU  countries  realize  the  true  costs  of 
escalating future conflicts with Germany. Certainly, defying 
German  wishes  with  a  veto  on  large  economic  questions, 
where EU unity is seen as pivotal and perceptions of discord 
will raise uncertainty in the financial markets, will be close 
to impossible for a high-debt peripheral eurozone member in 
the future. Berlin will increasingly get things its way in the 
European Union.
Or put another way, nothing will do more to diminish 
French  influence  in  the  European  Union  than  Germany’s 
new  economic  safe  haven  status,  combined  with  France’s 
own increasingly shaky government finances. Indeed superior 
German fiscal fundamentals may easily neutralize the advan-
tage of France’s growing population (compared to Germany’s 
forecast decline) in the EU Council’s double-majority rules, 
where both voting and population majorities are required for 
decisions to be taken.34 
Continued equal standing in the Franco-German axis at 
the heart of the European Union could correspondingly soon 
require policy reforms like, say, a higher French retirement 
age, a more liberalized French labor market, or similar struc-
tural reforms and related austerity measures. 
One immediate example of Germany’s postcrisis agenda-
setting power in the EU is the lack of serious demands from 
euro-zone external deficit countries of the consequences for 
them of the persistent German intra-eurozone current account 
surpluses. But, as the saying goes, you don’t bite the hand that 
feeds you in a crisis.
At  the  same  time  of  course  this  rise  in  the  German 
government’s economic and political power has exacted a cost 
on Germans and remains conditional. First of all, Germany 
has in the last decade undergone a tough economic transition 
34. The EU Treaty lays down the member states’ voting weights and the re-
quirements for simple majority, qualified majority, or unanimity. In addition, 
a member state may ask for confirmation that the votes in favor of a proposal 
represent at least 62 percent of the total population of the European Union. If 
this is found not to be the case, the decision will not be adopted. See http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=242&lang=EN. 
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War of 1812:  
1812–1815 Mexican-American  
War: 1846–1848




World War I:  
1917–1918
World War II:  
1941–1945
European Commission 
budget in 2010 = 1.17 
percent of EU GDP 
  Total federal government expenditure, 1792–2009
  Total federal government expenditure, excluding 
  War Department, Naval Department, and interest  
  on the national debt 1792–1945
  Total federal government expenditures, excluding 
  National Defense and net interest payments, 1940–2009
Source: MeasuringWorth.com; Expenditure data from 1972–1945 from US Census (1949); data from 1945–2009 OMB (2010). Note annual data from differing fiscal 
year periods.
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11characterized by intensive offshoring by and reorganization 
of the German corporate sector, accompanied by substantial 
structural reforms of pensions and (insufficiently still) labor 
markets to overcome the fiscal excesses of German reunifica-
tion and euro adoption. Indeed, it is easy to see a split between 
German politicians eager to pursue policies that will maximize 
their influence in the European Union and their voters, dissat-
isfied with having to bear the costs of these policies.
Secondly, Germany has set itself a tough fiscal benchmark 
in the form of its constitutional “structural balanced budget” 
amendment to take effect at the federal level in 2016.35 
And  thirdly  Germany  has,  as  discussed  above,  agreed 
at  least  initially  until  2013  to  provide  the  unprecedented 
anchor financing for the occasional future conditional bailout 
of  weaker  eurozone  countries  through  the  EFSF.  Germany 
will retain its crisis safe-haven status and increased political 
influence  only  if  it  can  continue  to  “lead  by  example”  on 
the two former issues, domestic structural reform and fiscal 
sustainability, while continuing to politically accept the latter. 
Therefore also out of a desire to entrench its safe-haven status 
and elevated political influence, Germany can be expected to 
continue its austerity measures, despite higher than expected 
economic growth and tax revenue figures for 2010.
Note  that  through  the  EFSF  Germany  has  in  reality, 
despite opposing it in general, accepted to participate in a 
facto  “crisis-only  Eurobond.”  The  EFSF  therefore  in  many 
ways represents the biggest politically possible step forward 
for a “common European fiscal policy,” precisely because it 
does not entail the creation of new permanent common fiscal 
policy institutions. Such a European fiscal policy is not and will 
likely never be politically feasible (see section IV) in the form 
of stable, frequent, large fiscal transfers between member states 
(e.g., like the US federal government budget transfers revenue 
between US states). However, the EFSF illustrates that ad hoc 
potential fiscal transfers between member states are politically 
possible in times of acute economic crisis in order to avoid the 
economic collapse of individual member states and associated 
spillover risks for the entire European Union. Or at least small 
member states, as the EFSF may not be big enough to shore 
up a large member state in acute crisis.36 
35. “Structurally balanced budgets” mean that a German government would 
be able to spend countercyclically and run deficits to protect the national 
economy against severe economic downturns, as for instance witnessed in 
2009. German states will have to adhere to the same structural deficit ceiling 
from 2020.
36. Put in another way, despite the measures taken by the European Union 
since early May 2010, it remains uncertain that the European Union will be 
financially able to bail out a large member state like Italy or Spain, were these 
two members to find themselves in a “Greece-like situation” in the future. This 
is unlike the situation in the United States, where there can be little doubt that 
the federal government would—if it politically decided to do so—be capable 
While the EFSF is therefore no substitute for a permanent 
“European fiscal policy” in normal times and hence won’t be 
of any help in preventing asymmetric shocks, it will be avail-
able when such asymmetric shocks and a corresponding acute 
crisis make its operation politically feasible. As such, the EFSF 
in some ways mimics Alan Greenspan’s approach to economic 
bubbles—don’t do anything to try to avoid them, but merely 
try to help clean up the mess afterwards. Not perhaps optimal 
in  terms  of  avoiding  economic  instability  in  the  eurozone 
(asymmetric shocks will still happen without an immediate 
central fiscal response), but the maximum politically feasible 
and a potent institution in fighting the effects of a eurozone 
crisis once it has arrived.
The battle about under what circumstances the EFSF can 
be made permanent will therefore be crucial for the long-term 
outlook for the stability of the eurozone.
VI. THE roaD PaST BErlIN aND BrUSSElS 
GoES THroUGH aN E-SDrm aND FINaNCIal 
markETS
Eurozone  governments  will  be  increasingly  aware  of  the 
enhanced German political influence resulting from diversi-
fied sovereign risk premiums and credit ratings. Or put in 
another way: For eurozone peripherals, as well as core coun-
tries like France, lack of sustainable government fiscal policies 
from now on means less political influence and ultimately 
fiscal sovereignty ceded to Germany.
So  for  EU  governments  contemplating  how  to  reduce 
moral hazard in a Europe where bailouts are feasible and what 
kind of SGP reform to accept, the real question is in some 
ways where they would rather in a future crisis risk ceding 
fiscal sovereignty to—Brussels, Berlin, or somewhere else?
In answering this question, what are the principal issues 
EU and German leaders must take into consideration?
First, EU leaders must respect the hard political constraints 
outlined in section IV that exist in today’s Europe, and there-
fore ignore the advice given to them by most macroecono-
mists and euro-federalists for much more EU integration and 
entirely new institutions, such as a fiscal union. Furthermore, 
any reforms must be implemented without having to change 
the Lisbon Treaty in order to be timely. Implementing a Treaty 
change in order to potentially strip members in excessive defi-
cits of the voting rights in the EU Council, as suggested in 
of bailing out even the largest US state of California. In Europe, therefore, it 
remains the case for large members that the only guaranteed rescue they can 
hope for is by “bailing themselves out,” i.e., putting in place the necessary 
domestic reforms to secure long-term sustainability (often by “defaulting on 
promises made to their own populations”).
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12the October 2010 Franco-German Deauville Declaration, is 
an utterly unrealistic option.
Secondly, EU leaders must be mindful that future German 
governments intent on and capable of structurally balancing 
their budgets make the immediate requirement for a tough 
new SGP or other measures against moral hazard less urgent 
for Berlin. Germany can afford to reject a “weak SGP” or 
other inefficient measures to check moral hazard that it does 
not like, knowing that it has powerful allies in the financial 
markets that will look unkindly on a failure of EU leaders to 
agree to limit moral hazard. Increased “uncertainty about the 
future of Europe” from a failure to put teeth into the SGP or 
implement other ways to limit moral hazard will cause periph-
erals’ bonds to decline and Germany’s to rise, so ultimately in 
the absence hereof, markets will do much of Germany’s dirty 
work for it by keeping free-spending EU countries on the fiscal 
path of virtue. This is particularly important to recall when 
thinking about how to potentially make the EFSF permanent, 
in so that were the EFSF to be allowed to expire in 2013, 
this would be potentially very costly for the weaker eurozone 
peripherals. Without the crisis-only rescue financing available 
from  the  EFSF,  they  will  rightly  be  perceived  by  financial 
markets as more risky and face higher costs of refinancing and 
will therefore be the big losers if the EFSF disappears. 
Thirdly, EU leaders must bring back the focus on debt 
stock levels in the eurozone to promote genuine longer-term 
fiscal sustainability, i.e., begin referring also to the 60 percent 
Total Government Debt Criteria in SGP enforcement.37 An 
immediate and rigid enforcement of the 60 percent general 
government debt ceiling is obviously not feasible today, as 
only a few eurozone members would qualify. Instead, more 
37. Often referred to as the “original sin” of the SGP, the 60 percent debt 
ceiling was politically sacrificed in 1997 to enable high-debt Italy and Belgium 
to become founding members of the euro. Ignoring the stock of debt, the SGP 
was instead focused only on adhering to the 3 percent annual budget deficit 
limit from the beginning.
flexible ways must be found that do not require a change in 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
Leaders could, for instance, broaden the current defini-
tion of general government debt included in the debt stock 
criteria to also include some types of private debt, and then 
dictate a higher range of permissible total debt stock of 60 to 
90(?) percent of GDP, depending also on other relevant issues 
like the domestic savings rate, future increases in age-related 
spending, or the extent of other government assets (European 
Commission 2010a). Based upon such a broader set of param-
eters, an appropriate speed (numerical target) of debt stock 
reduction should be identified for countries with more than 
60 percent of GDP in general government debt.
Fourthly,  EU  and  especially  German  leaders  should 
reject  a  “eurozone  exit  clause”  Eurozone  exit  must  not  be 
facilitated, as it is precisely the prohibitively high costs for 
weaker members of leaving the eurozone and the common 
currency38 that in the end provide the coercive basis for struc-
tural  reform  progress  in  these  countries.  Only  when  faced 
with the economic and political disaster of a forced eurozone 
departure do weaker countries contemplate swallowing their 
bitter economic medicine.39 Making it easier for such coun-
tries to escape tough structural reforms through a return to 
competitive devaluations is simply not in the European Union 
or Germany’s interest.40 Moreover, introducing a formal euro-
zone exit clause would require a change of the Lisbon Treaty.
Instead and fifthly, German and other EU leaders should 
adopt  a  less  far-reaching  “eurozone  orderly  sovereign  debt 
restructuring mechanism” (E-SDRM) without an exit clause. 
This will protect eurozone (especially German and French) 
taxpayers by ensuring creditors share the cost of any sovereign 
restructuring of weaker member states’ debts. Conceptually, 
such a mechanism would be close to the sovereign debt restruc-
turing mechanism (SDRM) proposed by IMF (2002) staff and 
could be implemented as a nominally “politically voluntary” 
agreement among eurozone members through the addition 
of the relevant legal clauses to national sovereign bonds.41 A 
change in the Lisbon Treaty would not be absolutely required.
38. See Blejer and Levy-Yeyati (2010) for a recent exhaustive analysis of such 
costs.
39. Or put in another way: Countries that enter the postcrisis eurozone 
prematurely in the future (like Greece did in 2001) will do so with a near 
certainty of falling increasingly under the sway of Germany.
40. The suggestions made by German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble 
in the Financial Times on March 12, 2010 are therefore against Germany’s 
national interest. See Schäuble (2010).
41. Mexico and several other countries in the early 2000s voluntarily issued 
national bonds with collective action clauses (CACs) enabling simple majori-
ties of debtors to amend the financial terms of the debt (and thereby force the 
hand of the minority) in ways corresponding to intent of the SDRM proposal. 
So for EU governments contemplating 
how to reduce moral hazard in a Europe 
where bailouts are feasible and what 
kind of SGP reform to accept, the real 
question is where they would rather 
in a future crisis risk ceding fiscal 
sovereignty to—Brussels or Berlin? 
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on the coming ECB risk control measures in its collateral 
program. Depending on their rating, coupon, and maturity, 
from January 1, 2011, the sovereign debt of a country like 
Greece will be subject to up to a 13.5 percent haircut when 
used as collateral in the Eurosystem’s open market operations.42 
As such, similarly to the precedent for eurozone bailouts after 
Greece, the eurozone will have a precedent for demanding 
diversified creditor haircuts on weak members’ sovereign debt 
from January 1, 2011.
Given the likely failure of EU leaders to sufficiently shore 
up the corrective arm of the SGP, so that credible financial 
sanctions would limit moral hazard in the European Union, 
the implementation of an E-SDRM has become more urgent. 
Unlike both the conditions attached to bailouts and a tougher 
SGP,  which targets EU governments, an EDRM would have 
private financial markets, e.g., bond investors, as its focus. By 
“bailing in” private creditors through required haircuts, an 
EDRM would—by transferring some of the costs of future 
bailouts  from  taxpayers  to  private  creditors—be  certain  to 
solidify the political commitment to provide  public money, 
too, to any future bailouts. 
Moreover,  by  establishing  an  E-SDRM,  EU  leaders 
would have the advantage of not having to push more unfore-
seen losses onto a shaky banking system and jittery financial 
markets in the middle of the next sovereign debt crisis. An 
E-SDRM would have the large signaling benefit to ex ante 
make it clear to investors that weaker eurozone members’ debt 
is in fact not risk free, despite the implicit political guarantee 
from the Greek precedent for bailouts. 
Hence  an  E-SDRM  will  have  the  effect  of  further 
increasing intra-Eurobond spreads, as weaker members’ bonds 
would now be viewed as relatively more risky than safe-haven 
Germany. Higher spreads would obviously further entrench 
German  economic  power  in  the  European  Union,  but  at 
the same time provide an additional and beneficial constant 
“nudge”  toward  both  structural  reforms  and  sustainable 
fiscal policies for weaker euro members. In some regards, an 
E-SDRM  would  therefore  directly  substitute  for  a  radical 
political strengthening of the SGP.
Given the lasting political benefits to Germany from an 
E-SDRM, it seems likely that it can only be agreed at the EU 
See IMF (2003). As pointed out in von Hagen (2010), this would create a 
dual market for countries’ bonds for a transition period: some with and some 
without covenants regarding mandatory haircuts in a restructuring. This issue, 
however, would be temporary.
42. See ECB July 28, 2010, press release at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/
date/2010/html/pr100728_1.en.html and annex of mandatory haircuts at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/sp090728_1annex.en.pdf?60ff4a
e0a22dc83d8398a5f33e03e725. 
level at times when German postcrisis political leverage is at 
its maximum. This may not be in relation to the EU Council 
negotiations  among  27  member  states  aimed  at  reforming 
the SGP framework by December 2010. Instead, Germany’s 
ability to extract a “quid pro quo” will be at its highest at times 
when “money is needed right away.” 
As such, the introduction of an E-SDRM looks perhaps 
more likely to happen as a “quid pro quo” separate from the 
SGP negotiations for either German acceptance of an exten-
sion of the current EU/IMF program for Greece. Such an 
extension  looks  likely  to  be  required  prior  to  2012,  when 
Greece is supposed to return to the long-term debt markets. 
Or  more  likely,  German  acceptance  of  making  the 
temporary  three-year  EFSF  permanent  after  it  expires  in 
May  2013—just  a  few  months  before  the  next  German 
Bundestag elections in the fall of 2013. In many ways, while 
the Deauville Declaration undercut the potency of the SGP 
(and new Brussels powers to police members’ fiscal policy), 
it fortunately simultaneously strengthened the likelihood that 
an E-SDRM will be implemented. This is clear from the key 
section of the declaration, which reads with respect to making 
the EFSF permanent:
The establishment of a permanent and robust framework 
to ensure orderly crisis management in the future, providing 
the necessary arrangements for an adequate participation of 
private creditors and allowing member states to take appro-
priate coordinated measures to safeguard financial stability of 
the euro area as a whole.43
Perhaps in return for the “undermining of the SGP,” the 
French government expresses its support for “private sector 
participation” (e.g., an E-SDRM-like framework) in future 
European bailouts. This is crucial, as historically few major 
changes in EU policy have occurred without the prior agree-
ment of France and Germany. Moreover, it should be recalled 
that—if France succeeds in making its fiscal outlook sustain-
able and hence secures its strong AAA rating—an E-SDRM 
framework will not be particularly costly for France. With its 
fiscal house in order, French bonds can be expected to closely 
track  those  of  Germany  even  after  an  E-SDRM  is  imple-
mented. Instead, the costs will be borne mainly by weaker 
peripheral members.
Europe in summary looks set to implement two out of 
three required measures against moral hazard in the future. 
Conditionality on all bailouts, as well as requiring haircuts for 
private creditors will eventually be in place, while the SGP will 
remain a largely toothless institution. Certainly, two out of 
three is not an ideal longer-term policy response from Europe 
43. See http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank_objects/Franco-german_dec-
laration.pdf.
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result of this crisis, but it is not bad either. With an E-SDRM 
eventually in place, Europe will not have “wasted this crisis.” 
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